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historic role in Rwanda. It would however, have meant that French denials of involvement in the 1994 tragedy were even less credible.
This article utilises in-depth semi-structured interviews that the author conducted with genocide survivors 4 
International Criminal Law and Complicity
Central to any discussion on the law of genocide and the subject of this article is the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter Genocide Convention) 7 , which the United Nations adopted on December 9, 1948, and which entered into force on January 12, 1951 . The Genocide Convention is an international treaty embraced by the realm of public international law, which draws on elements of international criminal law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law It must be underlined that negligence is incompatible with the specific intent requirement of genocide.
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As the ICTR observed in the Akayesu case 12 , an individual cannot be guilty as a participant in genocide 'where he did not act knowingly, and even where he 3 should have had such knowledge' 13 . Schabas defines complicity in genocide as incriminating those who 'aid, abet, counsel and procure, or otherwise participate in criminal offences'. 14 The proceedings of the ICTR in the case versus Akayesu have been interpreted as 'aiding' being defined as giving active assistance to someone, whilst 'abetting' involves facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto. 15 Following this, the concept of complicity in genocide has been developed in international jurisprudence to enable the prosecution of those who knowingly assist, aid, abet, procure or counsel genocide, but who never actually wielded the machetes, guns, or other tool of genocide and thus were not directly responsible for actual crimes. This notion of complicity can, it is argued, be extended beyond individuals to include corporate actors such as states. Such an argument springs from the growing literature on the notion of state crime.
The concept of state crime
Historically, criminal responsibility of the state is a concept that has been challenged by proponents of a strict reading of state sovereignty. 16 Such a legal positivist position would argue that as it is states that make laws, states cannot-by definition-break the law. Such a tautological argument of course privileges the state (and its actors) above and beyond responsibility for their actions. This logic was questioned at the post-war Nuremburg Trials but lay in abeyance for decades during the Cold War as realpolitik triumphed. However, an emerging consensus developed after the end of the Cold War and now can be said to exist that argues that states can commit crimes and that they should be held criminally responsible for such legal breaches. Whilst this consensus is largely academic thus far, state responsibility for international crimes can be said to be an emerging normative principle within international law. 17 With this regard, the concept of states being responsible for breaches of international criminal law was formally adopted in Part I of the United Nations International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 18 Indeed, the ICTR achieved several convictions on charges of complicity in genocide. 19 However those precedents, without exception, involved complicity by individuals as opposed to complicity by states.
Contraventions of Article III of the Genocide Convention have to date been levelled solely at individuals and although there is an affirmation within the Genocide Convention that states may not fail to act in the face of mass atrocities directed at the destruction of a particular group, no state has yet been held accountable in terms of the Genocide Convention. It is argued that this is logically incompatible with the accepted norm of complicity and that the role of the French in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is a clear example of this. Why this is so, is discussed below.
The subject of direct responsibility of states for genocide, in addition to state responsibility should they fail to prevent or punish acts of genocide, was debated during the This opens up the possibility of state complicity. 22 In 2001, the United Nations International Law Commission produced 'Draft Articles on State Responsibility' for intentionally wrongful acts, which were subsequently adopted and received by the United Nations General Assembly in 2001. 23 Crawford et al argue that this is one of the most important topics that the Commission has undertaken. and arms sales to regimes with questionable human rights records thrived. 33 In fact, Mitterrand was to subsequently prove to be Rwanda's closest military and political ally. France maintained a permanent diplomatic mission in Kigali during this time, allowing the embassy to keep abreast of the hate propaganda broadcast over the airwaves and printed in newspapers by the regime and extremist Hutu Power ideologues, as well as the persistent massacres committed by elements who would later became perpetrators of genocide. 44 There is no evidence that France sought to rein in such pronouncements; to the contrary, there is ample confirmation that the French were involved in encouraging such discourses.
Franco-Rwandan relations
A former Rwandan soldier has stated that '[t]he French soldiers would teach us that the Tutsi were our enemies and that we should kill them at any opportunity. The French taught us that if we allowed the Tutsi to return, they would take over our country. They would cause us to perish.' 45 Another former Rwandan soldier has testified that the French told them 'your enemy is the Tutsi. As long as they are alive, the Hutu will never be comfortable. 49 The aforementioned Interahamwe commander confirmed that after the killings began, his group was accompanied by four French jeeps with about 20 French soldiers. These French soldiers did nothing to stop the murders. "They could have stopped us, but they didn't " stated the commander. 50 It should be pointed out that these developments coincided with Rwanda being SubSaharan Africa's third-largest importer of weapons in the two years prior to the genocide, quite a feat for one of the smallest countries in Africa with a land area of just 9,633 sq miles. 51 Human Rights Watch claim that although not the sole supplier, it was the French who delivered the decisive military supplies and telecommunications equipment to the regime in Rwanda that later played an integral role in the genocide. 
Operation Amaryllis

Within hours of the death of President Juvenal Hayarimana in Kigali on the evening of 6th
April 1994, civil war mutated into genocide in Rwanda, with roadblocks being established and pre-prepared lists of targets for murder being distributed. 53 As violence raged, the French government, in coordination with other countries launched Operation Amaryllis, an evacuation mission to remove all European citizens from Rwanda. The operation was active between 8-14 April 1994. It needs highlighting that the first evacuees from Rwanda by French forces were Madame Agathe Habyarimana, the widow of the President, and thirty members of her family. To this day, this group remain genocide suspects and stand accused of being responsible for crimes against humanity. 54 As this is written, these individuals continue to enjoy the protection of the French state. In contrast, Tutsi members of staff at the French embassy were abandoned by the French, most being killed by the génocidaires. Deliveries of arms from France to the regime continued throughout the period of the genocide and indeed, one former member of the Interahamwe has stated that as a French shipment of arms was being unloaded from a French military plane at Goma airport, the French were assuring them '...you cannot be defeated because we support you'. The génocidaire adds that 'Once we unloaded the planes we were issued with the weapons and boarded onto buses at Goma to be taken to Kigali or some other place' to engage in the killings.
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On 17 May 1994, a United Nations arms embargo mandated a halt to all arms shipments to Rwanda. 59 However, as late as 18 July 1994 arms originating from France were still being delivered to the Hutu regime, which was now in exile in Zaire, another client state of the French. These arms transfers were conducted under the guise of Operation Turquoise (see below). 60 The sheer scale of French arms sales to Rwanda in the period immediately before and during the genocide played a major role in sustaining and escalating the violence. 61 The question of complicity clearly arises simply with reference to these weapons shipments.
Ending a genocide
By the end of May 1994, the RPF controlled most of eastern Rwanda and had put a halt to the genocide in this area. Human rights organisations and the media had by this time become aware of what had unfolded. Even the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé, was compelled to acknowledge that the events in Rwanda constituted 'genocide'. 62 That it was genocide committed by a close ally of Paris was elided. By this point in time, it was becoming evident that the RPF were close to toppling the regime in Kigali and achieving military victory. In full knowledge of these conditions, the French government put forward a resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a self-funded 'humanitarian intervention' in Rwanda codenamed Operation Turquoise. Resolution 929 was authorised by the UNSC on June 22 1994, providing the French intervention with an aura of authenticity. The Operation was described by France as 'a temporary multinational force' to establish secure humanitarian areas and its deployment was limited to two months. 65 There was in fact distinct apathy within the UNSC to Resolution 929, with five abstentions out of a total of fifteen council members. Few on the Security Council believed that France was motivated by strictly humanitarian concerns. 66 The general opinion within the UNSC was that it was unimaginable that France had had 'a crisis of conscience' and much more believable that it was about to use the cover of the UN to protect French interests in Rwanda and save Hutu génocidaires from retribution '. In addition to the French military, a few hundred troops from Senegal and Chad, and about forty from the Republic of Congo and Niger, supported Operation Turquoise. Dallaire argues that 'this was solely to give it an aura of multilateralism, but it was far from this'. 70 Given the well-known workings of Françafrique, this is most likely an accurate statement and fits in fully with French practice since the days of independence. The day after UNSC Resolution 929 was passed the French military arrived in Rwanda, heavily armed with mortars, light and heavy machine guns, helicopters, fighter-bombers, ground attack planes, reconnaissance planes and more than one hundred armoured vehicles. However the Force Commander of UNAMIR noted that there were very few trucks and those trucks present had no lift capabilities such as would be required for a notional humanitarian intervention. This led him to believe that this was primarily a military intervention, despite the stipulation by the Security Council that the intervention was for humanitarian purposes only.
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One genocide survivor who was in hiding in Kigali at the time has stated that the Interahamwe militia, responsible for the majority of the atrocities, 'gave the French a very warm welcome. There was much shouting and dancing in the street and French tricolours being waved around and the flags were hung even on the Rwandan Army military vehicles.
The killers were shouting "Vive La France"'.
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If the Interahamwe believed that French troops had arrived to stop their activities, this is a strange response. In fact, rather than quashing the massacres and drawing a halt to genocide in Rwanda, the arrival of the French troops buoyed the spirits of the near-defeated génocidaires who now felt protected by the arrival of their long term ally and reinvigorated to complete their task of exterminating the few remaining Tutsi. The Tutsi people of Bisesero were poorly armed with one survivor, Emmanuel Masozera, stating that 'at the start of the killings we only had a few machetes and clubs but the killers were armed with guns and grenades. We also had stones to throw that the women had collected. The women were really truly brave. We didn't think it would last long'.
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The Interahamwe hunted down the Tutsi on the mountainside each day, withdrawing in the late afternoon. The cycle would begin again relentlessly each day, every day. Those endeavouring to resist the genocide at Bisesero would seek cover in the undergrowth, waiting until the militia were close at hand, and thereafter attempt to overcome them. But the Tutsi of Bisesero were no competition for the well-armed and wellfed Interahamwe .
Survivors of Bisesero indicate that by late June 1994, from the peak number of 65,000 people hiding in Bisesero, only about 2,000 remained alive. Witnesses describe these emaciated survivors as suffering from untreated wounds and hiding in caves or within the densely wooded forests. It was only a matter of time before these last survivors would succumb. Then, resisters of Bisesero learned from one of their few working radios that French soldiers had in fact arrived in Kibuye Prefecture, with a UN mandate to stop the genocide. In the words of one survivor, they thought their prayers had been answered. 82 On arrival in Kibuye Prefecture, the French military established roadblocks and a headquarters post at Gishyita, a location that had coincidentally been used by thousands of 'If they kill us they kill us'. Not long before they came, the Interahamwe had killed some of our people and they [the bodies] were near me. Three were dead but two were still hot. We went and picked them and took them to the French cars. One had been shot and two were dead by machetes. I talked to the French soldiers through the window of the car [APC's] and asked what help they could be to us.
They stayed in their cars. They said they needed to know how many of us were here and said to bring everyone down out of the forests and onto the road" 90 .
Another witness who survived the massacres at Bisesero told the author that they were so desperate, they were prepared to take the risk, despite seeing that the French had arrived accompanied by Interahamwe. Some of these militia were actually recognised as being responsible for massacres at Bisesero over the previous weeks. The survivors believed that they would be surely safe from the militia, as there were French helicopters circling above.
Survivors of the genocide at Bisesero claimed that by using loudspeakers to hail people, 'the French were instrumental in talking the people out of their places of hiding':
'The French waited till we had done what they had asked and we were all out of hiding and gathered together on the road. They had started to look anxious. They just said "we cannot help you just now". They said they didn't have lorries and would have to leave, but promised they would come back soon. The French soldiers took the guns we had taken from the killers. We had eighteen guns but it did not matter because we had no ammunition and did not know how to work them. They must have thought we would be able to shoot our killers' 91 .
Rapidly, the survivors of Bisesero realised that the French troops that had arrived in the area appeared to be utterly disinterested in their plight. On his return to Kibuye one of the Interahamwe militia, Gusto, a former teacher who had escorted the French onto the Bisesero mountain, informed his leaders of the numbers and location of the remaining surviving Tutsi on the hillsides, and plans were made to destroy the last of the resisters. He claims that 'the French had no plans to save any of these Tutsi; our aims were the same -to kill the Tutsi. The
French supported the mission of the Hutu'. 92 So it was that only hours after the arrival of the There are currently an estimated forty genocide suspects in France, more than in any other western country. These fugitives fled to France in the knowledge that they would be treated with impunity. 
Conclusion
Genocide does not occur without preparation, which includes ideological preparation in addition to practical, logistical and strategic efforts. Such preparation can be usefully described as conspiracy to commit genocide, which is a crime under international law in terms of Article III of the Genocide Convention. The ICTY has clearly indicated that any assistance in genocide constitutes sufficient participation to meet the terms of complicity as This article concludes that to gain a greater understanding of genocide, it is essential to illuminate the actions not only of the genocidal state, but also the actions of those governments external to the country of genocide, whose policies are driven by their own national interests. This is a crucial, if relatively under-analysed, set of issues in the field of genocide studies and intervention. Greater insight into these dynamics is an essential step towards the prevention of future genocide.
In light of the evidence presented here, it is legitimate to question whether this atrocity could have been prevented if the government of France had expanded its national interests in Africa to include the welfare of ordinary Africans. It is only once criminologists and international jurists can begin to piece together all elements of the tragedy and instability in the Great Lakes Region that we will have a more realistic understanding of how international law might hold those responsible, through direct action or complicity, for one of the worst cases of genocide to blight human experience. Equally, such prosecutions-even of the "untouchables"-may make such actors think twice about their behaviour when similar tragedies occur in the future. 110 
